If the human race comes to an end relatively shortly, then we have been born at a fairly typical time in history of humanity. On the other hand, if humanity lasts for much longer and trillions of people eventually exist, then we have been born in the first surprisingly tiny fraction of all people. According to the Doomsday Argument of Carter, Leslie, Gott, and Nielsen, this means that the chance of a disaster which would obliterate humanity is much larger than usually thought. Here I argue for the principle, originally discussed by Dieks, that the case of a long-lived race provides a much greater chance to exist at all, and this cancels the Doomsday Argument, so that the chance of a disaster is only what one would ordinarily estimate. 1 Leslie has written extensively on this subject; his ideas are collected and summarized in [3] 
Introduction
The Doomsday Argument was introduced by Carter [1] and Leslie [2] 1 , and independently in somewhat different form by Gott [4] and also by Nielsen [5] . The general argument in the Carter-Leslie form runs as follows: There is some possibility that the human race will last for a very long time and grow to huge numbers. In that case, we have been born in the first tiny fraction of all humans, which would be very surprising. On the other hand, there is also some possibility that the human race will die out before too long due to some disaster (nuclear war, asteroid impact, etc.). In that case, we have been born roughly in the middle of all humans. (About 10% of humans ever born are alive today, so even if the human race were to end tomorrow, the average person alive today would just be in the last 10%.) This, claim Carter and Leslie, gives us reason to increase our estimates that the race will end before too long, making us typical, rather than going on a very long time, making us unusual.
The underlying idea is formalized by Bostrom [6] as the "Self-Sampling Assumption":
Every observer should reason as if they were a random sample drawn from the set of all observers. This is essentially Vilenkin's "principle of mediocrity" [7] applied to individual observers rather than civilizations. To derive the doomsday conclusion, according to Leslie and Bostrom, one proceeds as follows [6] . Something like 60 billion people have been born so far. Suppose for simplicity that there are only two possibilities: Either the race will die out soon, so that the total number of humans ever to be born is 200 billion, or it will last much longer so that the total number is 200 trillion. We will call the hypotheses of a shortor long-lived race S and L respectively. Suppose that before you take into account the doomsday argument, you think that the chances of these two alternatives are P prior (S) and P prior (L) = 1 − P prior (S). Now you take into account the fact that you are the Nth human to be born, with N ∼ 6 × 10 10 . The probabilities of S and L should be multiplied by the chance that your birth rank would have been N in each case, which we will denote P (N|a), where a ranges over S and L. Thus the chance of each alternative, taking into account N, is P (a|N) ∝ P (N|a)P prior (a) .
Including the normalization factor, you find that the probability that the human race will be short-lived is now P (S|N) = P (N|S)P prior (S) P (N|S)P prior (S) + P (N|L)P prior (L)
,
which is just Bayes's Rule. The chance to have a particular birth rank is inversely proportional to the total number of humans to ever exist, so P (N|S) = 1000P (N|L) and P (S|N) = P prior (S) P prior (S) + 10 −3 P prior (L)
Unless you started with P prior (S) ∼ 10 −3 or less, you will find that the chance of a short-lived race is nearly 1. Gott [4] makes a similar claim about the length of time for which the human race will exist, based on the "delta t argument". If a phenomenon exists for certain period of time T , then we should expect ourselves to be observing it at a random time during its life. Thus, for example, the chance that we see the phenomenon in the first or last 2.5% of its life is 0.05. Gott argues from this that if we know the amount of time t past for which the phenomenon has existed, then we can conclude that there is a 95% chance that the total lifetime will be such as to make 0.025T < t past < 0.975T .
We can rewrite this inequality in terms of t future = T − t past , t past /39 < t future < 39t past .
Applying this to the human species, Gott uses t past ≈ 200,000 years to conclude that there is a 95% probability that the future lifetime of our species will be between 5,100 and 7.8 × 10 6 years. Many counterarguments can be raised against the doomsday argument, but I want to concentrate here on a single one, as follows. In the scenario where the human race is very long-lived and there are many humans altogether, there is a greater "chance to exist at all" than in the scenario where the race is soon to die out. Thus our prior probability should first be multiplied by the number of people in each scenario. We can write P (a|I) ∝ N total (a)P prior (a) (6) where N total (a) is the total number of observers in case a, and P (a|I) is the probability of case a given that I exist to observe it. Then P (a|N) ∝ P (N|a)P (a|I) ∝ P (N|a)N total (a)P prior (a) ∝ P prior (a) . (7) Thus the increased chance of finding oneself in a long-lived race, because it contains more observers, exactly cancels the decreased chance of finding oneself with a particular N in the long-lived race. The chance of the race dying out quickly is thus the prior chance of such an event, whatever one computes that to be based on one's estimation of the various possible disasters. The doomsday argument does not modify the conclusion. The idea that one is more likely to find oneself in the long-lived race is called the Self-Indication Assumption by Bostrom. It was first discussed by Dieks [8] , and has since been criticized by Leslie [3] and Bostrom [6] and defended by Kopf, Krtous and Page [9] and by Bartha and Hitchcock [10] . I will give several arguments in favor and attempt to answer Bostrom's and Leslie's objections. I will also analyze Gott's argument specifically, and address the issue of why, if it is wrong, it seems to have had some success predicting the lifetimes of various phenomena.
Possible vs. existing 2.1 God's Coin Toss
The crux of the matter can be described by a "God's Coin Toss" experiment [3, 6] . Suppose that God tosses a fair coin. If it comes up heads, he creates ten people, each in their own room. If tails, he creates one thousand people, each in their own room. The rooms are numbered 1-10 or 1-1000. The people cannot see or communicate with the other rooms. Suppose that you know all this, and you discover that you are in one of the first ten rooms. How should you reason that the coin fell?
Leslie and Bostrom argue as follows. Before you look at your room number, you should think that since the coin was fair the chance of heads was 1/2. Now if the coin was heads, then of course you would be in one of the first ten rooms. However, if the coin was tails, the chance to be in one of the first ten rooms is 1/100. Thus, according to Eq. (2), you should now believe that the coin was heads with probability 0.99.
The alternative argument runs as follows. Before you look at your room number, you should think that the probability of heads is 0.99. There are one thousand possible people who would be right with that belief, whereas only ten would be right with the belief in heads. When you look at your room number, you should then update your probabilities using Eq. (2). The result is that in the end you think the chance is 1/2 that the coin was heads. Another way to say the same thing is that there are ten ways to have the coin heads and you in a room in the first ten, and ten ways to have the coin tails and you in a room in the first ten, and thus the chances for heads and tails are equal.
The difference here hinges on whether one considers possible people in the same ways that one considers actual people. If instead of flipping a coin, God creates both sets of rooms, then Leslie and Bostrom and I all agree that you should think it much more probable that you are in the large set before you look at your room number, and equally probable afterward. Treating the two possibilities in the same way as two sets of actual observers implies the Self-Indication Assumption: the existence of a large number of observers in a possible universe increases the chance to find oneself in that universe.
I will argue below that the equal treatment of possible and actual observers is correct.
Improving the experiment
It is possible to produce modified versions of this thought experiment which will avoid any disagreement, as follows. 2 Imagine that you are one of a very large number of experimental subjects who have been gathered, in case of need, into an experimental pool. Each subject is in a separate waiting room and cannot communicate with the others. First the experiment will be described to you, and then it will be performed. The experiment will have one of the following two designs.
Protocol 1 (random) The experimenter will flip a fair coin. If the coin lands heads, she will get ten subjects, chosen randomly from the pool, and put them in rooms numbered 1-10. If the coin lands tails, she will do the same with one thousand subjects in rooms numbered 1-1000.
Protocol 2 (guaranteed) The experimenter will flip a fair coin. If the coin lands heads, she will get you and nine other subjects, and put you ran-domly into rooms numbered 1-10. If the coin lands tails, she will get you and 999 other subjects and put you randomly into rooms numbered 1-1000.
How should you rate the probability of the outcomes of the coin flip, before and after learning that your room number is in the first ten? I think we can all agree that in protocol 1, before looking at your room number you should expect that the coin was tails with probability 0.99, because it is 100 times more likely in that case that you would have been chosen for the experiment at all. Then when you have learned your room number, you should think that the chance of heads was 1/2.
In protocol 2, since you knew that you would participate, you don't learn anything more when the experiment begins, so you should think the chance of heads was 1/2. After learning that you are in one of the first ten rooms, you should think that the chance for heads is now 0.99, in accordance with Eq. (2).
The question, then, is which of these scenarios is like the God's Coin Toss experiment. If God's Coin Toss is like protocol 1, then the chance of there being many people in this case is equal to the chance of there being few, and the Doomsday Argument is wrong. If God's Coin Toss is like protocol 2, then it is much more likely that there are few people, and the Doomsday Argument is correct. I believe that it is the first case, and thus the Doomsday Argument is wrong. The following section gives several arguments in support of this position.
Arguments

Asymmetry
Protocol 1 is symmetrical with respect to all participants. That is, each person sitting in their room, before looking at the number, can reason the same way. Protocol 2, however, does not have this property. You, as one of the originally chosen subjects, can reason as above. However, at most 9 other people can reason in this way. If there are one thousand subjects, the rest of them must have started with different initial information. The God's Coin Toss example is symmetrical with respect to all participants, and so is like protocol 1.
Note that it does not help to argue that you exist, and thus that you must be one of those chosen for the experiment. This is merely like observing, as you sit in your numbered room, that you have been chosen to participate. It applies equally in the case of protocol 1, and does not change the argument there. To claim that the God's coin toss (or the real world) is like protocol 2, you have to claim not only that you exist but that you exist necessarily, i.e., that God was required to choose you as one of the people to create, regardless of the outcome of the coin flip. You must also think that in case the coin landed tails, there would be lots of other people who were created but whose creation was not necessary.
Discontinuity
The Leslie-Bostrom analysis of God's Coin Toss has a strange discontinuity in the way in which your judgment of the chance of heads depends on the number of people created in that case. Consider the set of cases where on tails God creates 10 10 people, and on heads he creates some number N between 0 and 10 10 , and the particular value of N is known to you. If N = 0, then you can say with certainty that the coin fell tails, because otherwise you would not exist. If we treat the N and the 10 10 possible people the same way we would treat actual groups of people, then the probability we assign to heads smoothly approaches 0 as N → 0. But by Leslie and Bostrom's analysis, this probability is always 1/2 as long as N ≥ 1, but drops suddenly to 0 when N = 0.
Dependence on the nature of probability
There are different kinds of probability. One kind is based on ignorance, such as the case of the coin which has already been flipped but not yet examined. A similar kind of probability is the case of an event which has already been determined, but not yet occurred, and whose occurrence is too complicated to compute. An example is the falling of the ball into a slot on a roulette wheel after you make a last-minute bet (but see [11] ). Another example is the pseudo-random numbers generated by a computer. In the deterministic Newtonian worldview, all probabilities are of one of these types.
In contrast to this view, one can have classical indeterminism, in which outcomes of (some) events are determined truly by chance. One can also have quantum mechanical indeterminism, but that depends on one's interpretation of quantum mechanics. In the interpretation which just takes the wave function as fundamental with no collapse process, there is no indeterminism. There is also no indeterminism in the multiple worlds interpretation.
The multiple worlds interpretation is particularly problematic here. If one imagines that God's Coin Toss is really a quantum mechanical event, then in the literal multiple worlds interpretation, there are two sets of actually existing observers, one in ten rooms and one in a thousand rooms. In such a case, advocates of the doomsday argument agree that it does not apply. The same problem applies to the attempt to make predictions from a theory of quantum cosmology. If the universe is created with a wave function including many possible initial conditions, then our predictions will depend on whether or not we consider the various results of these initial conditions to actually exist. The claim that the predictions of a theory or the likelihood of disaster depend on the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a strange one, since physical processes (such as those that might lead to destruction) should not depend on a choice of quantum mechanics interpretations.
Dependence on the content of causally disconnected regions
At least as argued by Bostrom [6, page 123], the doomsday argument depends on whether or not we are the only intelligent species in the universe. He claims that if there are lots of extraterrestrial civilizations, of varying duration, then we should expect to find ourselves in one of the long-lived civilizations, thus canceling the doomsday argument. This means that how one should estimate one's future prospects depends on the existence of extraterrestrials, even if they are in causally-disconnected regions of the universe. Again, this is very strange, because one would think that conditions in places that can have no communication with us should not affect our future.
Reference class problems
The reference class is the set of all observers, which one needs (explicitly or implicitly) in order to say things like "one expects to find oneself randomly situated among all observers". There are many problems concerning the definition of this class. However, there is a special problem related to different treatment of possible and actual observers. Suppose that you know that God created one set of ten rooms with ten humans and another set of a thousand rooms with humans in the first ten and chimpanzees in the remainder. Finding yourself a human in one of rooms 1-10, you can conclude that it is equally likely that you are in the set of just ten or the first ten in the thousand. In this case, it is not necessary to discuss the mental capacities of chimpanzees. But now suppose that God flips the coin and creates either just the ten humans (if heads), or the ten humans and 990 chimpanzees (if tails). I would argue that finding yourself a human in one of rooms 1-10, you should conclude that the chance that the coin fell heads is 1/2. But if you believe the analysis of Leslie and Bostrom [6, page 77], then the result depends crucially on whether you could have been a chimpanzee. If chimpanzees are in the reference class, then the argument is the same as the original God's Coin Toss, and it is nearly certain that the coin fell heads. On the other hand, if chimpanzees are excluded from the reference class, perhaps because they can't understand philosophical arguments, then you are necessarily in one of rooms 1-10, and so the chance of heads is still 1/2. Thus the different treatment of possible observers has led to a situation where you need to know something about the intellectual capacity of chimpanzees, even though you already know you aren't one.
Unreasonable predictive powers
Although it may seem to beg the question, one can argue that the existence of the doomsday argument may itself be a reason not to believe that possible and actual observers should be treated differently. The point is not the undesirability of the doomsday conclusion, but rather that it does not seem that one should be able to infer such conclusions about the future by looking only at the past. The probability of a disaster should be just the probability that it will occur given the pre-existing conditions.
One might imagine the case of a gambler who is about to throw a set of fair dice. If she wins she will spend her winnings on some action that will increase the eventual number of people, such as the funding of space colonies. Should she then think that her chance for the dice to fall favorably is reduced below the normal statistical probability?
This problem can be further strengthened, as follows.
Paranormal and backward causation
Bostrom [6, chapter 8] points out that if one accepts the doomsday argument one must also accept a number of very strange similar arguments. For example, suppose that there is some kind of a natural happening that we have no control over but nevertheless wish to avert. For example, suppose that we learn that a nearby star has a 90% chance of becoming a supernova, causing significant destruction on earth but not killing everyone. Now we make the plan (and make sure that it will be carried out) that if the supernova occurs we will start an aggressive program of space colonization, leading to a huge increase in the number of people that will eventually exist, while otherwise we will not. Now the same doomsday argument that says that the human race is likely to end soon tells us that the supernova is not likely to occur. If it did occur, we would then be in the first tiny fraction of humanity. Not only does this seem to allow us to affect things over which we should not be able to have any control, but it even works backward in time. By exactly the same argument, even if the supernova has or has not already occurred in the past, and its effects have not reached us, we can change the chance of its having occurred by the above procedure.
Obviously this kind of paranormal and backward causation is ridiculous. Bostrom says that it is not as bad as it seems, but to do so he has to resort to some rather strange argumentation including the claim that given some action A and some consequence C, one can consistently believe "If we do A then we will have brought about C" and "If we don't do A then the counterfactual 'Had we done A then C would have occurred' is false". It would seem easier just to say that the type of argumentation that gives us these paranormal powers, and thus the Doomsday Argument as well, is simply incorrect.
We can perhaps understand this situation better by trying to construct it using the experimental protocols above. In the random assignment case, there is no problem. We get Protocol 3 (random assignment, late decision) The experimenter will first choose ten subjects randomly and put them in rooms 1-10. Subject #10 will then get to flip a coin and call the outcome. If he is correct, the experiment is over. If not, the experimenter will choose subjects randomly to fill the rest of the thousand rooms.
Does this give subject #10 any special ability to influence the coin flip? No, because of the reasoning above with respect to protocol 1. Finding yourself in the first 10 rooms in this case gives you no special information about the coin flip.
To produce an analogy where the supernova argument would work is very tricky. In the case where the coin is indeterministic, it cannot be done. The experimenter must first fill rooms 1-10 without knowing the flip outcome. Thus she doesn't know whether to put you (the privileged observer) into one of these rooms or not, so she cannot create situation where you have an equal chance of being in any of the thousand rooms, in the case of incorrect prediction. I suspect that this issue is at the heart of Leslie's [3] claim that the doomsday argument depends on the nonexistence of "radical indeterminism".
In the case where there is determinism, then perhaps the experimenter can arrange the experiment as desired by advance knowledge of how the coin will fall and how subject #10 will call it, giving Protocol 4 (guarantee, late decision) The experimenter will choose ten subjects and put them in rooms 1-10. Subject #10 will then flip a coin and call the outcome. If he will be correct, then the experimenter will make you one of the first ten subjects at random. If subject #10 will be incorrect, then the experimenter will fill the remainder of the thousand rooms, and will assign you to one of the entire thousand rooms at random. Now can you infer that subject #10 has special powers to predict the coin flip? Indeed you can. Your chance to have been in one of the first 10 rooms is very small if he's going to call it wrong, while it is guaranteed if he's going to call it right. On the other hand, one can see that this is really just that the experimenter has given you some special knowledge about the outcome of her amazing predictive abilities. Furthermore, she cannot have given this information to everyone, because all "guarantee" protocols treat some of the observer specially. I don't think the real world where we are trying to avert some disaster has much in common with this model.
Nonrepeatability
Suppose that God flips his coin many times and creates many batches of people, some in sets of ten and some in sets of a thousand. Then even Leslie's argument doesn't yield a doomsday prediction. All sequences of coin flips are equally probable, in this interpretation, but the great majority of the time there are many small sets and many large sets. Thus before looking at your room number, you expect to be in a large set. After finding that you are in the first ten, you now reduce your estimate of the coin flip relevant to you to nearly equal probabilities of heads and tails. The same result could be seen in a repeated version of the "guarantee" protocol in which the experiment is done many times and the guarantee is that you will be one of the subjects in one of the runs, with equal probability to be any one of those subjects. Thus Leslie's argumentation depends on there being only a single universe. He agrees with this and says "In cases like this we must reject the intuition. . . that to estimate probabilities we ought to ask what bets would maximize winnings when the experiment was repeated infinitely many times" [3, page 228 ]. This does not seem to bother Leslie, but it is a strange claim. In some theories of probability, probability just means the bet that would maximize winnings, but even if one doesn't accept this as a definition, it still seems clear there is something wrong with a system for computing probabilities that yields odds vastly different from how a bettor should bet. 4 Gott's analysis 4 
.1 Problems
Gott's argument, discussed in the introduction, suffers from two important errors pointed out in a letter by Buch [12] . They are discussed in detail by Caves [13] and by Bostrom [6] , so I cover them somewhat quickly here. First of all, Gott [4] makes a simple omission: he does not include the prior probabilities for the various lifetimes. Gott corrected this omission in [14] and [15] by saying that we should start with the "vague Bayesian prior" or "Jeffreys prior" [16] ,
This means that the chance for T to be in any logarithmic interval is the same.
Once we have the prior probability, Gott claims we can determine the probability for various lifetimes according to Bayes's Rule as P (T |t past ) ∝ P (t past |T )P prior (T ) .
Here P (t past |T ) is the chance to measure t past given that the actual lifetime is T , which is
Putting Eqs. (8) and (10) into Eq. (9) gives
which reproduces Gott's predictions. Unfortunately, there are still two problems. The first is that Gott's prior is not reasonable for any ordinary phenomenon. For one thing, it cannot be normalized, and even if one doesn't consider this a technical difficulty, it means that the chance of T being in any given finite interval is zero. Even if we adopt Gott's suggestion to establish cutoffs at some tiny and some huge lifetime (e.g., [14] recommends the upper limit 10 5,000,000 years), the prior chance of any reasonably sized interval is infinitesimal. For example, Gott applied his principle to the Berlin Wall, built in 1961 and observed by Gott in 1969. Would it be reasonable to use the "vague prior" here? To check this we can ask what would be a reasonable expectation for the lifetime of the wall at the time that it was built, and thus when no "past lifetime" information was available. How would you have estimated the chance that it would last more than a year and less than 100 years? More than a year and less than 100,000 years? If you think that either chance is nonzero, then you don't believe in the vague prior. (In the case with the cutoff, there would be 5,000,000 factors of 10 in the range of possible durations, so the chance to be between 1 and 10 5 years is 10 −6 .)
The second problem [12, 13] is that Gott has neglected the fact that a long-lived phenomenon is more likely to be presently ongoing, and thus to be observed, than one which is short-lived. Thus if P prior (T ) is the probability that a phenomenon of the class under consideration chosen randomly from among all such phenomenon ever to exist has lifetime T , then the probability that a phenomenon chosen from all those currently existing has this lifetime is P currently existing (T ) ∝ T P prior (T ) .
Following [12] , we call this the anthropic factor. Its effect is to cancel the factor due to P (t past |T ) to give
Thus we do not learn anything new from knowing the past lifetime, other than that the total lifetime must be at least as large as what we have observed. Our judgment of the longevity of the phenomenon is still what we get from the prior probability, i.e. from our analysis of other information we may have about its lifetime. The anthropic factor of Eq. (12) is very much like the argument of previous sections that an observer is more likely to observe a world with many observers than one with few, and the cancelation that leads to Eq. (13) is very much like the cancelation that leads to Eq. (7) . In both cases, when one takes the relevant principle into account, one finds that the conditional probability based on one's observations is just the prior probability.
However, in the present case there is no need to resort to complex argumentation to justify the use of Eq. (12) . For a simple example, we can consider the case of radioactive decay [12] , where the prior is known. Consider nuclei of some radioactive element with lifetime τ . Each such nucleus will live for sometime T after the time at which it is created, and the distribution of T is
Now suppose that we find such a nucleus lying about our laboratory, and somehow we're able to trace its history and learn its t past . Now by Gott's argument, we should think that its total lifetime is distributed as
which is not correct. Including the anthropic factor gives the correct answer
Thus in an elementary case, we see that it is correct to include the extra factor, and thus that no "extra" information can be derived from considering the past lifetime.
Successes
Gott made many predictions by applying his principle, and many of them appeared to be confirmed. If his principle was wrong, why did his predictions turn out so well? One reason is that using an unreasonable prior probability and not including the anthropic factor cancel each other to some degree. It's hard to know what would be a reasonable prior probability for examples like the Berlin Wall, but Gott also studied the lifetimes of Broadway and off-Broadway plays and musicals, and in this case we have a large dataset and can do statistics. I analyzed all Broadway shows listed in the Internet Theatre Database (www.theatredb.com) that opened between 6/1/70 and 5/30/90 to determine their running time. 3 The data are shown in Fig. 1 . The data points are the percentage of shows whose running time (number of days counting both opening and closing days) is within the given number of days. Thus the first data point is the number of shows running only one day, the next is those running two or three days, and so on.
It is clear from Fig. 1 that the actual distribution does not fit Gott's prior very well at all. The "vague prior", Eq. (8), would give equal numbers of events in each interval, and thus a flat distribution in Fig. 1 . Instead, there is a peak around 50-100 days, and a sharp decline after that.
However, for durations after the peak, and excluding a few very long duration shows, the number of shows in a logarithmic interval is well fit by the curve P prior (T )dT ∝ T −0.7 d ln T ∝ T −1.7 dT , shown by the dashed line in Fig. 1 . This is close to P prior (T ) ∝ T −2 , which yields Eq. (11) once one properly takes account of the anthropic factor, and thus reproduces Gott's calculations [13] . This explains some of Gott's successes in predicting the longevity of long-lived shows.
What about shows with short t past ? It's clear that Gott underpredicts their duration. For example, Gott gives a show which has been open 44 days a 97.5% chance of closing within 4 × 39 = 156 days, but from the 20 years of data described above, this chance is only 78%. However, very few of Gott's sample had been showing for such low periods of time, so the number of opportunities for him to make such an error was small.
What about the future of humanity? Gott claims that since N past ∼ 7 × 10 10 people have been born so far, the number of humans yet to be born is between 1.8 × 10 9 and 2.7 × 10 12 , and thus the current birthrate is unlikely to continue for more than 19,000 years. 4 This argument, however, neglects the "anthropic" factor, and uses the "vague prior". If we do the calculation correctly, we just reproduce the prior probability, and so the issue is to make our best estimation of our probable survival. One could debate this estimate at length, but it is clear that it is not the "vague prior", since there is obviously some chance of our species perishing in the near future. In fact, it seems that the previous lifetime of our species is essentially irrelevant to many of the possible causes of our destruction. It doesn't really matter how long it took and how many people lived and died before we achieved the technology to destroy ourselves. The danger is at the present time when we have the ability to destroy our species but lack good safeguards that would prevent us from doing so. Moreover, it seems as though a sensible estimation of our chances is bimodal. There is a nonzero chance that we will become extinct or lose our technological abilities in the relatively near future. But if this does not happen, if it is likely that we will colonize the galaxy, and then our chances of surviving a very long time are quite high. Thus a sensible distribution for the lifetime of humanity or the number of people who will ever be born is not smooth or monotonic.
Counterarguments
Confirming evidence
Leslie [3, page 226] gives the following example about the probability of theories that yield different numbers of observers. Marochnik [17] suggested a theory in which planets (and thus observers) occur only around stars near corotation (the distance from the center of the galaxy at which the individual stars orbit with the angular velocity of the spiral arm pattern). Suppose (to strengthen the argument) that this suggestion was made before our Sun's position was known, and then it was discovered that it was quite close to corotation. Surely this should be viewed as important support for Marochnik's theory.
On the other hand, Leslie argues, if we give greater probability to universes with more observers (the "Self-Indication Assumption" -SIA), the chance of being here at corotation is no larger in this theory than in one in which planets were common throughout the galaxy. Thus the theory that planets are everywhere and the theory that planets are only here give the same probability for us to be where we are. It appears that in fact the evidence does not lead us to prefer the Marochnik theory. Leslie rejects this consequence and claims that it shows that SIA is wrong.
What has happened here? Is it really true that accepting SIA means that we have no support for Marochnik's theory, even though it has successfully predicted our position in the galaxy? That's not quite right. However you look at it, you should agree that you have a much better reason to believe this theory after the observation than before. The issue is how likely this theory was in advance of observation. If you feel that in advance of observation, the theory was wildly unlikely, then you can feel even though the evidence has made it much more likely, that it is still not an especially well-supported theory. The reason to feel that it is a priori unlikely, of course, is that it leads to a very small number of observers, as opposed to the theory in which planets are common everywhere. (You could also feel that this theory is unlikely, in advance of observation, because of the possibility that it will immediately be ruled out by finding that we are in a place where no planets should have been.)
Let's consider instead, for a moment, a problem about different galaxies instead of different theories. Suppose that some galaxies have planets around every star, while others have planets only in a special place. Once we have learned this, we should think it highly likely that our galaxy is one with planets everywhere. However when we later find that we ourselves live in the special place where all galaxies have planets, then we should feel no preference about which type of galaxy we have. It would not be right to say that it's more likely that we are in a few-planet galaxy because that would "explain" or "correctly predict" our position in our galaxy. Half the planets in our position are in few-planet galaxies, so we should think the chance that we are one of those is 1/2. Now consider an intermediate case where the number of planets depends on some other parameter of cosmology. For example, consider a situation where you think that the hot dark matter (HDM) and cold dark matter (CDM) theories of cosmology are equally likely. Then suppose you find out that CDM would lead to planets around every star, while HDM would lead to planets only in a special place. 5 At this point, I think you should consider the CDM theory much more likely to be correct, because it predicts many observers, while the HDM theory predicts few. If now you find that we are in fact in the special place where both theories predict planets, you should return to thinking that the two theories are equally likely, just as in the previous case. The number of civilizations finding themselves in the position which we find ourselves is the same in the two theories, so we have no reason to prefer one over the other. Now let us return to the Marochnik case. Suppose that before considering the effect on the number of observers or measuring our position in the galaxy you think that the Marochnik theory and the planets-everywhere theory are equally credible. Then, I claim, when you take account of the differing number of observers, you should think that the planets-everywhere theory is far more likely, and when you find our position in the galaxy is as Marochnik predicted, you should go back to finding the theories equally likely. I realize that it is quite counterintuitive that one should not believe this theory when it has made a correct prediction, but I think the situation is as in the model above, where the idea that we are in a few-planet galaxy correctly "predicts" our location, but that does not make it more probable that we are in fact in the few-planet galaxy. 6
Bostrom's "presumptuous philosopher"
Bostrom [6, page 134] gives a related example. Suppose that we are certain that one of two cosmological theories is correct, but don't have a strong preference between them. Both predict finite universes with contents similar to ours, but one theory predicts a universe a trillion times larger than the other. Physicists would like to do an experiment which will determine which theory is the correct one, but the presumptuous philosopher explains that this is unnecessary. Since one theory has a trillion times more observers than the other, we already know that that theory is a trillion times more likely. Is this in fact an argument against the Self-Indication Assumption, or should we just accept that the presumptuous philosopher is correct? As above, we can consider the case of a single agreed-upon theory that includes a large number of universes, some a trillion times larger than others, and we wanted to know which type of universe we were in. Then the presumptuous philosopher would be right that the chance of being in a small universe is infinitesimal. It seems to me that, from the arguments of this paper, the presumptuous philosopher is also correct in the original scenario, as long as we feel that the likelihoods of the two theories are roughly equal before one considers the effect on the number of observers.
However, one should give at least some consideration to the idea that a theory which involves a very large number is less likely to be correct than one which does not. For example, suppose I have a crazy theory that each planet actually has 10 10 100 copies of itself on "other planes". Suppose that I (as cranks often do) believe this theory in spite of the fact that every reputable scientist thinks it is garbage. I could argue that my theory is very likely to be correct, because the chance that every reputable scientist is independently wrong is clearly more than 1 in 10 10 100 . To avoid this conclusion, one must say that the a priori chance that my theory was right was less than 1 in 10 10 100 . It seems hard to have such fantastic confidence that a theory is wrong, but if we don't allow that we will be prey to the argument above.
You may say that this really just shows the strange consequences of accepting SIA. However, similar scenarios exist without any dependence on the number of observers. For example, suppose a stranger comes up to you with the claim that if you give him a dollar today he will give you $10 tomorrow. Presumably you won't give him the dollar, which shows (if you are maximizing your expectation) that you think the chance he will come through as he says is less than 10%. On the other hand, it would be strange to claim that the chance is less than one in a million, since sometimes people making statements like this are honest. At this level you might even consider the possibility that your whole understanding of the world has one chance in a million to be very wrong, and so you can't trust your expectation that you won't be paid to this level. Nevertheless, if the payoff is raised to $10 million, you still won't give the dollar, which shows that now you think the chance for a payback is in fact less than 1 in 10 million. In order to not have a proposed payback large enough to deprive you of your money, you must think that the likelihood of getting paid decreases at least inversely with the proposed payback.
Applying this to cosmology, it is possible that one should think that a theory involving a very large universe is unlikely in proportion to the size of the universe it proposes. In this case, the presumptuous philosopher is wrong, because the tiny a priori probability for the theory with the larger universe cancels its larger number of observers. The theories must then compete on their merits.
Conclusion
When you learn new information, you should update the probabilities you assign to various hypotheses, based on the new information. You should now favor hypotheses that made the new data seem likely over those that made it seem unusual. Thus whatever chance you assign to the possibility that the human race will end fairly shortly, you should increase it when you take into account the position in which you find yourself. Knowing that you are among the first 70 billion people to exist gives you reason to prefer theories in which the total number of people ever to exist is not much larger than 70 billion. This is the Doomsday Argument [1, 3, 6] .
On the other hand, I have argued here that when you take into account the fact that you exist at all, you should update your probabilities in precisely the inverse manner, finding it more likely to be in a race with a larger total number of individuals. This effect follows if one considers the case where there might be a large number or might be a small number of people as analogous to the case where there are a large number of people of one kind and a small number of another. This effect exactly cancels the effect of taking into account your position in the species.
The result of including both these effects is the same as the result of including neither. You judge the probability of early doom to be whatever you judge it to be from considering the actual processes that might put an end to humanity. You get no other information from arguments about your existence and when you were born. This agrees with our intuition that the chance of an event (e.g., the earth being hit by an asteroid) should not depend on the event's consequences (e.g., humanity being wiped out).
In the case of Gott's argument, the situation is clear. One must include the fact that longer-lived phenomena are more likely to be currently ongoing to get sensible predictions [12, 13] . Once one does so, Gott's argument does not change the prior probability distribution for the longevity of a phenomenon.
In the case of the Carter-Leslie argument, the situation is not as clear as that. However, I have given a number of arguments that we should in fact treat universes with longer-lived human races as more likely for that reason, until we take account of our position in the species. With this effect included, there is no force in the Doomsday Argument.
Nevertheless, I would not want anyone to become unconcerned with the future of humanity as a result of the present paper. Serious dangers do face us, and we should work to minimize them, even if they are no larger than one would at first think.
